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Abstract 
Good care is often positioned as a natural by-product of the widespread availability of good 
information (‘inform to care’). This paper contests this association through empirical investigation of 
the information-care relationship in the context of dementia care. It combines critiques of the 
‘informatisation’ of care with insights from the epistemological dimension of care ethics to argue 
that information is better understood as ‘situated knowledge’ and that the relational practices of 
care involve the mobilisation and negotiation of different types of knowledge that are specific to 
caring relationships and contexts. The argument is illustrated through the three cases of caring 
relationships taken from a qualitative evaluation of an information and support course for carers of 
people with dementia. These cases highlight the specificity of caring relationships and the very 
different consequences of introducing new forms of knowledge into each relationship and provide 
evidence for the need for a paradigm shift where the idea of informing to care is replaced by a 
process of informing with care. In the former, information is understood as separate and outside of 
care, while nevertheless acting upon it to produce care; in the latter, information is understood as 
inextricably linked to care (with care) but not in any predetermined or uni-directional sense. The 
paper identifies key interlinked components of the ‘inform with care’ approach derived from the 
cases discussed. 
 
Introduction 
As far back as Information for Health (NHS Executive 1998), information policy from the Department 
of Health in England has made grand promises about the potential of information to transform 
health care in favour of patients. Information for Health spoke of ‘harnessing’ the ‘information 
revolution’ to ‘benefit patients’ (NHS Executive 1998, 5) and the latest Department of Health 
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(England) information strategy (Department of Health 2012a) continues this theme. Information also 
figures prominently in the Public Health White Paper Healthy lives, healthy people: our strategy for 
public health in England (Department of Health 2010) which talks of the need to ‘harness the 
information revolution to make the best use of evidence and evaluation and support innovative 
approaches to behaviour change throughout society’ (no page number).  Similarly, the Social Care 
White paper: Caring for our future (Department of Health 2012b) places heavy emphasis on the 
importance of good information in the provision of improved care and commits £32.5 million to a 
new website with information on care and support and talks of the ‘power of information’ to ‘drive 
more integrated care’(12).  
While the emphasis of these policy documents differs slightly, all share a belief in the transformative 
power of information, with good care being positioned as a natural by-product of the widespread 
availability of good information. In this paper, we address these assumptions through empirical 
investigation of the information-care relationship in the context of dementia care, where, in line 
with this ‘information to care’-type thinking, the Dementia Strategy for England (Department of 
Health 2009) emphasises the objective of enabling better information. Drawing on a study of family 
carers’ experiences of undertaking an information course designed precisely to support their caring 
relationships (arguably, then, supporting them in delivering ‘better care’), we explore the 
relationship between information and care and explicate the sometimes complex relationship 
between the two. We start by exploring the contested nature of both ‘information’ and ‘care’ and 
setting out our theoretical approach which understands information as ‘situated knowledge’ and 
care as ethical practice. We then examine three cases of care relationships drawn from an 
evaluation of the Alzheimer’s Society’s ‘Carers’ Information and Support Programme (CrISP)’ 
(undertaken in the UK in 2012-13) in order to develop a more situated and relational account of the 
relationship between information and care and propose a new approach to practice that involves 
informing with care rather than to care. 
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The informatisation of care 
A growing body of work developing critical perspectives on the information paradigm in health and 
social care draws attention to the way in which care is being marginalised by information. Spoel 
(2006) in a study of informed choice in a midwifery context, argues that the dominance of the 
consumerist model of information provision to ‘empower’ women to make ‘autonomous’ choices 
risked creating situations in which information was replacing care. Salander and Moynihan (2010, 
119) show how the ‘instrumental intervention’ of ‘information giving’ that dominates the new 
approach to cancer care fails to address the fact that ‘healing’ is a ‘contextual experience’. Salander 
and Henriksson (2005) argue that the delivery of information may be less important to patients than 
expressions of care, and Sinding et al (2010, 1099) show how women’s attempts to ‘deflect and 
reframe’ responsibility for decision-making and to elicit physicians’ opinions in the context of breast 
cancer, can be read as resistance to the rational information paradigm that dominates the current 
organisation of cancer care. In a study of information aimed at encouraging self-care in the field of 
‘healthy living’, Author et al (2011) draw explicitly on Mol’s logics of choice and care (Mol 2008) to 
make sense of the resistance to healthy living messaging they encountered amongst participants. 
They argue that calls for more collective forms of responsibility, rejection of the ‘facts’ of overweight 
and obesity in favour of more situated and embodied understandings of healthy weights, and 
accounts of ‘good‘ or ‘useful‘ information resources that highlight the importance of local social 
networks, can be understood as forms of resistance to the logic of choice and as attempts to 
articulate an alternative ‘logic of care’ (Mol 2008). From this perspective, healthy living and the (self) 
care practices involved cannot be reduced to an individualised, rational process of information-
seeking and choices resulting in improved health outcomes. Rather, these practices manifest as 
messier, emotional and uneasy processes often involving uncertainty, anxiety and self-doubt, along 
with a need for interdependence between others with shared experiences, and support and 
expressions of kindness from help/service providers (Author et al 2011).  
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A related body of literature in medical sociology has examined how ‘expert’ or professional 
knowledge, often now packaged as the more neutral ‘health information’ (Nettleton 2004, 673) is 
held up as superior to other forms of knowledge and is often resisted by patients and carers for 
failing to take account of knowledge based in the patient experience. A parallel set of arguments 
exists in the literature on, and from within, service user movements, drawing attention to the 
importance of the experiential knowledge of those living with, for example, disability or mental 
illness, for understanding illness, its impacts and what helps in its treatment (e.g. Barker, Campbell 
and Davidson 1999). Author et al (2010) have argued that, in seeking to understand how people 
engage with health information, it is vital to recognise the contextual nature of information, 
understanding all health ‘information’ as forms of ‘situated knowledge’: views from ‘somewhere’, 
rather than ‘nowhere’ (Haraway 1991). In her study of telecare, Pols (2012 82) has distinguished 
between three different types of situational knowledge that are enacted in care practices - 
‘propositional knowledge’, such as medical knowledge about the physiology of a disease, ‘know-
how’, such as clinical knowledge used to improve the daily life of patients, and ‘know-now’, the 
practical and embodied knowledge of living with a disease. According to Pols, having ‘know-now’ is 
what makes it possible for patients to translate different kinds of knowledge into practically useful 
knowledge that enables living life with a disease. She argues that different forms and combinations 
of knowledge are needed at different times and that these are different yet ‘interdependent’ 
knowledges. 
 
However, it is important not to lose sight of the way that knowledge links to power. Although the 
value of patient and service user experiences, as forms of knowledge, is now being recognised in 
diverse policy responses including those of ‘Expert Patients’, ‘Experts by Experience’ and various co-
production initiatives, this is by no means uncontentious and questions about who controls the 
production of knowledge and how issues relating to, for example, disability and mental illness are 
framed and researched, continue to be a focus for action and contention by service user movements 
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(Author 2013). Understanding information as ‘situated knowledge’ draws attention to information as 
a site of political contestation concerning both whose and what knowledge is regarded as relevant 
and legitimate in specific care contexts. It also emphasises the significance of practices that enable 
experiential and professional knowledge to be negotiated amongst those giving and receiving care. 
In order to reflect on the complexities of caring relationships and further explore the place of 
information within these, we draw from work on the ethics of care.   
 
Care: affect, epistemology and ethics 
The origins of the ethics of care lie in Gilligan’s (1982) distinction between judgements based in the 
application of abstract principles (justice ethics) and a situated, contextualised assessment of what is 
right in a particular situation (care ethics). Care ethics is grounded in a recognition of the relational 
ontology of human subjects and the necessity of care to survival and well-being (e.g. Sevenhuijsen 
1998). In a recent review of care in diverse contexts, Author (2012) argued that care needs to be 
understood in three ways: as a way of conceptualising personal and social relations, as a set of 
values or moral principles, and as a practice. Tronto (1993) identifies the dimensions of care as 
comprising: attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness, all of which are necessary 
to the integrity of care. These perspectives are in marked contrast to a view of care as a commodity 
to be chosen and delivered, or as an oppressive practice to be resisted and replaced by the 
apparently more neutral notion of ‘support’ (Author 2011). In recognising care as a necessity for all, 
care ethics also unsettles the distinction between subjects identified as either ‘givers’ or ‘receivers’ 
of care, acknowledging that the same person can occupy both positions at the same and different 
times (Ward 2011). 
The importance of knowledge to good care is also addressed in care ethics. For example, Kittay 
(2010) draws on her experiential knowledge of being the mother of a young woman with severe 
cognitive disabilities to challenge conclusions drawn by some moral philosophers about the moral 
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worth of such people. In particular, she invokes the necessity of ‘epistemic responsibility: know the 
subject you are using to make a philosophical point; and second, epistemic modesty: know what you 
don’t know’ ( 401). She argues that a failure to acknowledge what is not known is a moral failure.  
The importance of the epistemological dimension to care ethics in the context of both policy making 
and care practices has also been argued by Author (2012). Of most direct relevance to our argument 
here is the role of knowledge in the context of care practices, whether these comprise the work 
undertaken by those in paid caring roles, or in the context of family and friendship relationships 
through which care is given and received. Sevenhuijsen refers to the ‘knowing and thinking subject’ 
(1998, 89) of feminist care ethics, and Tronto’s element of ‘competence’ assumes that the care giver 
can and does draw on a range of types of knowledge to ensure competent care. Author suggests 
that knowledge includes: knowledge about the problems facing the care receiver and how they may 
impact the individual and the relationships in which they are engaged; knowledge of different forms 
of practice and how they might assist in the particular context being addressed; knowledge about 
available services and entitlements to welfare benefits that might provide practical assistance and 
relieve strains associated with coping with everyday life. She offers examples of where lack of 
knowledge and a failure to understand the impact of specific practices can result in a failure of care 
(pp. 77-8). In the specific context of work with people with dementia, Brannelly (2011) highlights the 
importance of an intimate knowledge of family relationships and history to enable good care. 
But whilst those using health and social care services should expect those in paid helping roles to 
draw on professional knowledge and practice wisdom, recognising care as a relational practice 
suggests that we should not think of knowledge in use as uni-directional. Recognising the 
significance of the experiential knowledge of those who receive care as necessary to the process of 
care helps address the power imbalances that have led some to reject care; in care ethics terms we 
can understand such recognition as necessary for ‘responsiveness’ (Tronto 1993; Author 2012). We 
can also suggest that one aspect of the responsibility of care givers (paid and unpaid) is to learn from 
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the experiential knowledge of the care receiver. Pettersen and Hem (2011) offer a rather different 
perspective. They suggest that ‘mature care’ requires that the care receiver recognise the point of 
view of the care worker, their relatives and other patients (the context is that of in-patient mental 
health services). A ‘lack of cognitive flexibility’, they argue, ‘makes it difficult for those cared for to 
correct, change, nuance or expand their understanding of their own situation in the light of others’ 
input’ (221). Naming ‘cognitive flexibility’ as part of the process of care emphasises that we should 
not understand care solely in terms of affect or practice skill, but also as requiring the capacity to 
recognise and work with different types of information and knowledge.  
Thus, care receivers need to be active participants in the process of care and this necessitates a 
dialogic process in which responses from the care receiver inform the practice of the person(s) 
caring for her/him. In the case of dementia or other cognitive impairment, such responses may be 
expressed non-verbally. Author (2012) has argued that Tronto’s element of ‘responsiveness’ should 
be developed to encompass the way care receivers contribute experiential knowledge to the care 
process and that this offers a means of counteracting the danger that care ethics focuses too much 
on caregivers rather than care receivers.  
Author (2012) also notes the affective nature of both care and information. Whilst care ethics 
understands care as more than a compassionate response to another, it is given and received in the 
context of relationships that both embody and are likely to generate difficult and conflicting 
emotions for care givers and receivers. Not only do these emotions constitute a key aspect of the 
context that impacts care, they also constitute important information about the value attached to 
the object of the emotion (Nussbaum 2001). Thus, for example, an angry response from a care 
receiver to an offer of help can inform the caregiver of the importance attached to being able to 
perform the relevant action alone. 
Combining critiques of the informatisation of care with insights from the epistemological and 
affective dimensions of care ethics offers us a way of moving beyond an understanding of 
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information simply as a resource for better care. Understanding all information as ‘situated 
knowledge’ enables us to recognise both the different types of knowledge necessary for good care 
and the power relations that are integral to the mobilisation of different knowledges in the practices 
of care. Care ethics, with its explicitly relational ontology, enables us not only to recognise caring as 
a relational practice, but to recognise the ways in which knowledge links to care. In particular we 
wish to emphasise here the need for epistemic responsibility and epistemic modesty (knowing the 
subject of care and, conversely, acknowledging what you don’t know); second, the importance of 
cognitive flexibility required to recognise and work with different types of knowledge; and third, the 
importance of understanding the emotional or affective aspects of both information and care.  
 
In the following sections, we consider three case studies that enable us to explore the situated, 
complex and contingent relationship between information and care in the context of family carers 
and dementia care. We do so in order to further define and refine an alternative paradigm for 
understanding and practising information-care relationships: ‘inform with care’. Our cases are drawn 
from an analysis of data collected for an evaluation of an information and support programme run 
by the Alzheimer’s Society (AS) for carers of people with dementia.  
 
Methods 
The ‘Carers’ Information and Support Programme (CrISP)’ was designed ‘to improve knowledge, 
skills and understanding for those caring for a person with dementia, by providing effective support 
and up-to-date, relevant and evidence-informed information’ (Alzheimer’s Society 2012). With two 
colleagues, we were commissioned to undertake an evaluation of this programme from the point of 
view of carers. The study, involving 25 carers in seven sites in England was undertaken between 
2012 and 2013 (see Authors et al 2013). The sample was selected to include a diversity of care 
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relationships including co-resident and non co-resident carers, carers in rural and urban areas, 
spouse and adult child carers, and male and female carers. Most of the spouse carers but only about 
half of the adult child carers lived with the person they cared for. Most of those caring for a parent 
were in their 50-60s and most caring for a spouse were in their 70-80s. Those being cared for were 
between 70-85, including six who were living in nursing or residential care. In five cases, the person 
with dementia had died before the interview took place. Interviews lasted between one and two 
hours and took place either in the carers’ homes or in confidential spaces at local AS offices. Ethical 
approval was gained through the University of XXXXX Research Ethics and Governance Committee 
and in line with ethical procedures required by the AS.  
 
Our perspective on the importance of understanding the significance of information in the contexts 
of caring relationships necessitated situating subjective responses to participating in the CrISP 
programme within the specific caring relationships and contexts involved. We therefore adopted the 
narrative interview method and invited carers to tell us about how they became a carer and how 
their caring relationships had developed over time, before asking more focussed questions about 
their responses to the CrISP programme itself. In this way, we were able to analyse their accounts in 
the context of their different experiences of, and responses to, caring for a relative with dementia.  
 
Data were analysed thematically, while drawing on the narrative structure of interviews to prevent 
the loss of context that can accompany the thematic approach. Data were analysed manually, with 
initial coding of transcripts undertaken by all team members, before being shared and refined to 
produce the final themes presented in the full evaluation (Authors et al 2013). Key to our analysis 
was the importance of understanding that the carers who participated in the CrISP programme 
were, in this context, care receivers as well as care givers and that their experience of the context in 
which they were being offered information and support was key to their ability to deliver good care 
to their family member (see also Authors et al 2014). In this paper, we illustrate and develop this 
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theme further through a series of three case studies taken from the full evaluation. The cases were 
deliberately chosen to reflect both contrasting experiences of taking part in the programme and 
contrasting caring relationships and are not, in any sense, being presented as representative of all 
carers’ experiences. Rather, in each case, we elucidate the complex relationship between 
information and care to develop an empirically –driven conceptual analysis that argues for a new 
ethical approach to information provision (‘inform with care’) which is able to recognise and address 
the complexity, situatedness and relationality of information-care giving and receiving to move 
beyond the currently dominant ‘inform to care’ approach. 
Information and relational care 
Colin and Mary 
Colin, aged 50 and still in full-time work, described himself and his wife as an ‘odd couple.’ Mary was 
75 and was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease 6 months prior to the interview. Colin had noticed 
changes suggesting there was a problem approximately two years previously. Colin never felt fully at 
ease on the course. In particular, he objected to the lack of recognition of the distinctiveness of 
spousal relationships in the context of living with someone with dementia, reflecting a broader 
reaction to the homogenising impact of official designations of ‘carers’ (Molyneaux et al 2011). He 
noted: 
She’s not my partner, she’s my wife...Partner and spouse I don’t think are quite the same 
thing at all. But taking those two in isolation, partner/spouse is a completely different set of 
emotions to siblings or to non-relative carers, a completely different set of emotions. 
Later he said: 
...the two ladies  [the other two spouse carers in the group] got very upset quite a few times. 
I did but I wasn’t going to admit to it at the time. And there wasn’t enough – it was very 
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clinical, the course...there wasn’t enough emotion or care for the people you’re actually 
dealing with. 
Colin described the lack of attention to the specific emotional dimension of caring for a spouse with 
dementia as ‘thoughtless’. His response to the course was impacted, from the start, by what he 
considered an excessive amount of ‘administration’ that he interpreted as ‘backside covering’. He 
said all course participants were given a number and ‘you’re thinking, I am here to get help, I don’t 
want to become a number and it seemed very authoritarian, very big brother...’. Although he 
recognised that those running the course wanted to maintain confidentiality, by making the process 
an impersonal one, it alienated him which, in turn, had a direct impact on his ability to engage with 
the information sharing aspects of the course: ‘Don’t treat me like a nobody because if I’m nobody 
then the information you’re giving me is not going to gel.’ 
Colin resisted being identified as his wife’s carer and emphasised that she was at an early stage in 
her dementia. He described Mary as still being able to do things, but as forgetting things, starting to 
repeat herself and putting things away in odd places. He saw his attendance at the course as a way 
of finding out things he needed to know while protecting her from the full impact and likely 
prognosis of her diagnosis. As the interview progressed, he acknowledged that he might be ‘fooling 
himself’ in terms of the extent to which things had changed.  
Whilst rejecting the designation of ‘carer’, Colin did accept that he and Mary were involved in a 
‘caring relationship’. Indeed, it was his attempt to sustain a ‘normal’ caring relationship between 
husband and wife that was the source of his negative reaction to much of the information presented 
on the course: ‘By the time we got to the end of the second session I felt like coming out and 
slashing my wrists’. 
Rather than getting the help he needed, Colin felt he was being exposed to ‘doom and gloom stories’ 
about what was likely to happen and that this was much too early for him. In response to the 
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interviewer’s question as to whether he found it hard to take the information on board, he 
responded that the problem was that he did take it on board: 
It was far too detailed, far too heavy, ah, it was scary, it really was scary and you think to 
yourself, ‘there’s nothing I can do about that’. Which I know there’s nothing I can do about it 
and perhaps it’s a bit ‘ostrich in the sand’ but you don’t always want to know. 
Colin’s overall assessment was that it had been a ‘horribly soul-destroying course’. 
Pauline and Francis 
Pauline’s (second) husband Francis had experienced depression and anxiety for some time before he 
was diagnosed with dementia. He was also an alcoholic. His mother had also had mental health 
problems and he was very aware of, and resistant to, the stigma of being labelled mentally ill. 
Pauline herself was physically disabled and had previously cared for her first husband who was also 
disabled. Francis had committed suicide just a few months before the interview with Pauline.  
Pauline’s response to the CrISP course was much more positive than Colin’s. As someone who had 
long been active in relation to disability issues and who, in her professional life, had worked in adult 
education, one of her first responses to Francis’ diagnosis was to find out as much as she could 
about dementia and to register with an Alzheimer’s Society Forum where carers could share 
information. She adopted a critical perspective on the way the course tutor put over information, 
suggesting there were things she would have done differently, but became more impressed with him 
as the course went on. She also commented on the value of receiving and sharing information in an 
interactive way: 
when we first started, I realised that I’d already found all that before, but it was very helpful 
hearing it again with the other people there. I think I found the people that did the course 
with me as much value to me as... as what was in the course.  
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Pauline went on to use the knowledge she had gained in the context of setting up a support service 
for others living in the supported housing complex to which she and Francis had moved.  
Pauline’s initial response was to understand information as a practical resource that could enable 
her to become more competent as a carer. Unlike other carers we interviewed, she also sought to 
share the information she accessed with Francis, in the belief that he too would find this helpful. 
However, she came to realise that what she described as her ‘clinical’ approach to this was not 
helpful because the information she gave to Francis frightened him. She located her approach to this 
not only in relation to her usual way of acting, but also to the way in which they had previously 
discussed and shared things with each other: 
I don’t think I dealt with Francis very well. I mean, erm... because I’ve always been known to 
be a person that researches things, and if I found something of interest I might quite 
unwittingly, not intentionally, say, ‘Oh!’ you know, ‘I’ve got some good information here’ and 
talk... because I would forget that he actually had dementia, and we’d always talked about 
things and discussed things. 
Her actions in seeking out information were intended not only to help her improve her knowledge as 
a basis on which to care, but also to find out about services that would benefit him. But information 
did not necessarily result in the provision of services: ‘I wanted him to have the services and we 
couldn’t seem to find any.’ And perhaps more significantly, it appeared to both contribute to his 
sense of despair about his illness, and to his sense of his wife being in opposition to him. 
Pauline also recognised the way in which his perception of a shifting power relationship impacted 
her relationship with him as his carer. She contrasted this with her experience with her previous 
husband with whom she had shared the experience of physical disability. Talking about Francis, she 
said: 
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he didn’t like me doing it (the course). He thought that I was capitalising on his illness, 
because I was interested in it. (pauses) It’s so different looking after somebody with an 
illness like his and looking after somebody with a physical illness. When I was looking after 
John, my first husband, he was, he was happy that I was always trying to find ways of dealing 
with problems of paraplegia, and we both used to read the same things and look at the same 
things and go to the same things. But Francis felt that I was capitalising on his illness, yeah. 
 
Pauline reflected on the very different situations of those doing the course with her and 
distinguished ‘what I would call [those who have] got quiet dementia’ from the challenges she faced 
in dealing with the extent of Francis’s physical as well as emotional agitation.  She had come to 
recognise the emotional impact and consequences of information and the necessity of 
encompassing this in using information in order to care, but also thought that, whilst it might have 
helped  ‘if I’d been the touchy-feely sort of person and (pauses) but I wasn’t and I’m not. And he 
knew I wasn’t, and there’s nothing we can do about it.’ 
Thus, while Pauline did think that the course had made her better equipped to care, she also 
recognised the limits to what information could help with: ‘I couldn’t get into his head, if you know 
what I mean. I couldn’t understand how he was thinking. I don’t think there’s a course that would 
ever allow me to do that.’ 
Lesley and Edna 
Lesley was caring for her mother. At the time of the interview, Edna had quite advanced vascular 
dementia and used a wheelchair to get about. A year or so before the interview, Lesley had given up 
employment as an adult education tutor to care for her mother and father, ill with cancer, full-time. 
Prior to his illness, Lesley and her father had shared Edna’s care, although her father had his own 
mental health challenges and also needed taking care of: 
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so there were lots of issues with my dad’s mental health, so I was trying to not damage that, 
at the same time as doing the best that I could to look after my mum and, at the same time, 
looking after my dad, and they had very different needs… 
Information was key to Lesley’s ability to care for Edna, although she describes how, in the early 
days, prior to diagnosis, ‘just coping’ was her priority. Later, when her caring role became what she 
describes as ‘more established’, she started to seek out information and develop more knowledge 
about dementia and its progression. Lesley had been an IT tutor and described how her experience 
enabled her to ‘pinpoint what was valid information’ and ‘sort of sort the wheat from the chaff’. She 
was concerned that others could have been left ‘ill-informed or frightened by what they’d read’. She 
reflected on how important these skills were as she couldn’t remember anyone involved in Edna’s 
diagnosis actually pointing her in the direction of any relevant information, saying ‘…I don’t 
remember anybody saying “you might find this useful”. It was a case of me finding things out for 
myself’.  
At the time Lesley undertook the course, she was still caring for both her mother and father and 
describes the timing of the course as ‘perfect’ because she was at her ‘most stretched’ at that time. 
She described feeling really stressed as her father’s prognosis worsened and she began to really 
worry about how Edna would react to his death. She describes this as a time when she began 
questioning her own caring approach, asking, ‘Am I doing this right?’ and of the ‘dawning’ of the real 
sense of responsibility she began to feel at this point. She describes a need for reassurance when she 
says ‘…because you haven’t got somebody sat next to you saying “yes, you’ve done a good job 
there” and “try this, perhaps, next time” ’, conjuring up the sense support that many carers found 
they needed and that the course was able to offer to most. The course left Lesley feeling much more 
‘relaxed’ about how she cares for her mum. She describes how she would never have thought 
herself capable of being a carer and that she had ‘astounded’ herself with what she’d ‘managed’ and 
had begun to feel ‘quite proud’ of what she does.  
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Lesley was very positive about the timing of the course and what she had learned from it. Lesley 
talked about learning new ways of being with her mother and of learning from other carers’ 
experiences. She described herself as someone who always wants to ‘go and get on and get things 
sorted’ and, in some ways, her focus on information searching fits in with this. However, when 
reflecting on how the course had changed her, she describes how she had learned to ‘recognise 
when it’s not appropriate to take that style when looking after mum’. Instead, she had learned to be 
‘softer’, ‘reflective’ and ‘thoughtful’. She describes learning to watch and learn from observation 
about what might be the best way forward in terms of caring practices, a shift that we might think of 
as learning to be more ‘attentive’. Lesley’s increasing awareness of the importance of understanding 
information in the wider context of care is further illustrated by her responses to questions about 
the content of information provided on the course. She was quite circumspect about its value for 
her. While she did talk positively about the ‘wonderful hand outs’ and how she ‘clung to them like 
gold dust’, she explains how their value was determined by the extent to which they were able to 
convey the experiences of other carers. She describes how she valued their content ‘particularly 
where there were quotations from other carers’ experiences’ and continued: 
…it was very much brought into real life by examples or experiences as part of those 
information sheets…a professional person can write wonderful, wonderful text, but it 
doesn’t hit home if it’s not from the heart. And where other carers have given comments, 
you think, ‘They understand’. 
Later, Lesley talked about learning to think from the perspective of the person with dementia and 
how that helped her care for her mother in a way she felt happier with. This perspective was 
communicated to carers via course tutors who used images in a powerful way to help enable carers 
to experience the world as a person with dementia would. Like several other carers, an example of 
people with dementia not using a conservatory because it involved crossing a rug that they saw as a 
pond, was experienced by Lesley as ‘revelationary’. She described how, ‘from that moment’, she 
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began to ‘view thing very differently’. This means of helping carers to identify with the person they 
were caring for, to experience their world, and adapt their caring practices with an awareness of this 
new perspective, was not ‘information provision’ in any conventional sense. Instead, it may be 
understood as a means of conveying the ‘experiential knowledge’ of the people with dementia to 
carers and, as such, as a key element in enabling understanding of how dementia impacts the way 
people view the world. 
When asked directly what it was about the course that helped her most, Lesley described it as ‘like 
being wrapped in cotton wool’. She talked about feeling ‘valued’ and ‘hugely welcome’ and ‘very, 
very safe’. She also spoke about it being a space where one could say ‘anything at all’ and not ‘shock’ 
people and where, even where information was ‘fearful’, it was handled in a supportive way, as in, 
‘we will help you with this’.   
Discussion 
Our analysis of the relationship between information and care suggests the need for a paradigm shift 
where the idea of informing to care is replaced by a process of informing with care. No longer is 
information seen as separate and outside of care, while nevertheless acting upon it to ‘produce’ 
care. Instead, information is understood as inextricably linked to care (with care) but not in any 
predetermined or unidirectional sense. Here we draw on these three cases from the dementia 
family carers’ information and support programme to identify key interlinked components of the 
proposed ‘inform with care’ approach. 
Recognising that information can confound and undermine caring relationships as well as support 
and enhance them is the first important message we wish to get across here. Informing with care 
means being attentive to the emotional or affective aspects of information/knowledge and the ways 
in which new information or knowledge can destabilise as well as support caring relationships. Colin 
linked his ‘ostrich in the sand’ reaction to much of what he heard on the course to his being ‘scared’ 
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by what he heard. This strong emotional reaction meant that he was unable to process and make 
use of what was being offered to support his caring relationship with his wife. Colin’s impression was 
that this was neither acknowledged nor addressed by the course facilitator, oversights that he 
described as ‘thoughtless’ but that we might redefine as ‘careless’, as informing without care. 
Our second point concerns what Kittay has called ‘epistemic responsibility’ (Kittay 2010). Our cases 
suggest that informing with care involves ‘knowing’ or recognising the specificities of the individual 
carers and the caring relationships which they are in. Brannelly’s (2011) consideration of the case of 
a 38 year old Pakistani woman with dementia and her family supports this. Colin needed, but felt 
deprived of, recognition of what he considered the distinctiveness of the spousal relationship and 
this appears to have contributed directly to his alienation from the course and his sense of being a 
‘nobody’ which, in turn, meant that the information could not ‘gel’. In contrast, for Lesley, the 
course came at exactly the right time; she felt recognised as someone struggling to feel confident in 
her current caring practices and she was able to identify with other carers and learn from their 
experiences and insights within a context where information and care were experienced as 
intertwined. Lesley flourished because she felt recognised – valued, welcome and ‘very safe’. She 
was able to apply the information offered not only in terms of practical suggestions, but also as 
confirmation of her competence as a carer who was doing her best not only to do the right thing, but 
also to do it right. In the case of Pauline and Francis, the programme’s focus on information for 
caregivers, rather than care receivers, appears to have exacerbated Francis’ sense of powerlessness, 
an experience that has been articulated by many disabled people in relation to their carers. 
Informing with care in Pauline and Francis’ case might result in calls for interventions that work with 
care receiver as well as caregiver, to better enable both to understand each other’s response to their 
situation. 
Our third point concerns the importance of understanding information as situated knowledge and 
how different types and combinations of knowledge are appropriate in different caring contexts- no 
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two contexts are ever identical. Having the cognitive flexibility to recognise and practice with 
different knowledges, while being sensitive to questions of power, is key to informing with care. 
Lesley and Pauline, in particular, drew attention to the importance of the experiential knowledge of 
other carers on the course for helping make sense of the more propositional knowledge about the 
progress of dementia that was offered by course facilitators.  Pauline acknowledged that she had 
heard much of what the course offered before but that ‘hearing it again with other people’ was 
especially important and that the people that did the course with her were ‘as much value’ as ‘what 
was in the course’. Lesley’s account similarly acknowledged the importance of the ‘wonderful texts’ 
but stressed that their value was determined by the extent to which they were able to convey the 
experiences of other carers. It was this experiential knowledge, coming from ‘the heart’, that helped 
her make use of the more factual knowledge about dementia and connect with others who really 
‘understand’ in ways that could really support her care practices. This account illustrates well how 
Pols’ ‘know-now’ involves working with different kinds of knowledge to enable ‘living life with a 
disease’ (Pols 2012, 87). 
Finally, the particular context of this study enables us to reflect on the significance of the process of 
information sharing as well as the consequences of better information for care in practice if we are 
to inform with care. The CrISP programme was set up as both an information and support 
programme with the support generated by bringing carers together as well as being offered by 
course facilitators from the Alzheimer’s Society. In many cases, this worked well and enabled 
precisely the kind of close connection between information and care we are advocating (see Authors 
et al 2013). However, we cannot assume that creating these shared spaces necessarily delivers 
support or enables carers to feel cared for. For information to enable care, the context within which 
this is shared needs to be experienced as ‘caring’ and our three cases demonstrate quite different 
experiences of this. Colin never found or experienced such support or care, but Lesley did and this 
impacted the benefit she derived from the information per se. Whereas Colin had struggled to trust 
the course tutor and the context provided, Lesley placed complete trust in both and was able to reap 
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the benefits of what she experienced as a fully caring context. In the context of the complex 
personal issues facing Pauline in her relationship to Francis, and in the light of her long term and 
continuing activism in relation to disability issues, the course offered her a valuable space within 
which she could develop her understanding of dementia and use this not only in the context of her 
personal situation, but also in developing supports for others in a similar situation. However, these 
personal benefits came at a cost in terms of her relationship with Francis, something that went 
unacknowledged on the course. 
 
Conclusion 
We have drawn on an empirical study of an information and support programme for family carers of 
people with dementia (the CrISP course) to point to the limits of the ‘inform to care’ approach 
currently dominating policy and many practice settings. We have drawn on three cases of care 
relationships in that study to argue for a more situated, complex and contingent understanding of 
the relationship between information and care and for a practice that reflects this understanding- to 
‘inform with care’. Our argument reflects the importance of understanding care as an ethical, 
relational practice, rather than as a commodity that can be enhanced by better or more information. 
Our insights and arguments have implications beyond this study of dementia care. Informing with 
care can be developed as an ethical practice that means asking what happens to care and caring 
relationships whenever new information or knowledge is introduced in care contexts. It means 
asking what information does to care, as well as what care can do for information – understanding 
that how information is provided can be as important as its content. It also means ensuring that 
information and care don’t become delinked, something that is especially important in contexts 
where health and social care information is increasingly being both digitised (provided ‘at a distance’ 
from, and outside the context of, caring relationships) and marketised, with private sector 
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organisations playing ever greater roles in managing and delivering health and social care 
information. 
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